Has Saddam's WMD program been discovered already?

Look no further than Libya

As a software developer I often spend time debugging programs. One little maxim I've found very useful, usually after bashing my head against a brick wall for hours, is "if you can't find the problem where you're looking then you are looking in the wrong place". I think that maxim applies to WMD.

From The Strata Sphere:

Some of this speculation was confirmed when these reports surfaced claiming that the Niger Forgeries were created by Libya to divert suspicions from a Libya-Iraq-Egypt alliance, where Libya purchased the yellowcake for Saddam and others.

New attempts are being made by officials from Niger to obfuscate the political picture with regard to the supply of Niger-originating uranium to Iraq. However, there is now a growing possibility that the reality that Niger supplied uranium to Libya, and that Libya hosted the Iraqi strategic weapons programs from about 1998 onwards, will be openly acknowledged by US and UK governments in the near future.

I have no clue to the veracity of these claims or where this group comes from. But the fact that we found a nuclear weapons capability in Libya shortly after Saddam’s regime fell is consistent with the scenario were we traced Saddam’s weapons to Libya and Libya gave up the ghost when we confronted them.

However, by the mid 1990s, Baghdad could no longer be selective in its cooperation with Libya. The BND's 1994 studies of the Iraqi procurement system in Europe was unsettling for it threatened Iraq's ability to revive key WMD programs just as the Iraqi system was being restored to its pre-Gulf War magnitude. Moreover, the UN inspection regime was beginning to grasp the complexity of the Iraqi challenge. Indeed, even before the Summer 1995 "defection" of Lt.Gen. Hussein Kamal, the UN was increasing its efforts to locate hidden stuff. As discussed above, Kamal's "defection" was prompted by Baghdad's apprehension that the UN was capitalizing on data provided by genuine defectors in order to zero in on Iraq's hidden WMD facilities. For example, Iraq's biological facilities were first subjected to a meaningful inspection in April 1995, on the eve of the "defection." Even though by then, Baghdad had already hidden its biological weapons cache and destroyed all evidence of its existence, the mere UN visit to the abandoned sites was too close for comfort.

Meanwhile, with the Iraqi-Libyan cooperation in chemical weapons development and production going well, Saddam authorized already in the Summer/Fall of 1994 the move of other weapons programs to Libya. Arrangements for closer cooperation were quickly made.

In January 1995, Iraq and Libya signed a major agreement whereby Iraqi specialists will work at a secret Libyan establishment on the development of a long-range ballistic missiles with range of about 1,000 km. A senior Iraqi Trade Ministry official, Hajem Attiya Salma arrived in Tripoli for final discussions with AbdAllah Hijazi, the head of Libya's Scientific Research authorities. In the agreement reached, Qadhafi agreed to pay the salaries of the Iraqi experts -- some $1,200 a month -- as well as finance the acquisition of Western technology. Moreover, the Iraqis were promised access to the Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean missile technology Libya had already acquired. Baghdad promised to share all the experience acquired in the Gulf War. Iraq did not have much alternative. Incapable of working, the Iraqi design teams built around experts trained at the best European and Russian establishments were falling apart. Now Qadhafi was offering to fund and provide cover for the revival of the al-Hussein and Badr missiles under the cover of the Libyan al-Fatakh program.

Meanwhile, the Libyans were most interested in the Iraqi experience with biological weapons, particularly the advanced stages of the militarization projects. In the ensuing negotiations, Baghdad acknowledged that Iraq still possessed several biological weapons and warheads for them. The Iraqis would share these technologies with the Libyans provided that Tripoli agreed to also sustain and fund the revival of the Iraqi military nuclear program. By 1995, some of the Iraqi nuclear materials were being held in Algeria while the key systems and design elements were being hidden all over Iraq in dormant state. Iraqi experts were apprehensive that the lack of proper maintenance and storage conditions under the sand in desert temperatures were destroying the sophisticated equipment. Hence, the Iraqi negotiators suggested that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks after the signing of an agreement, and that Iraqi experts in Libya would then be able to begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized kilns/furnaces.

As expected by the Iraqis, the lure of nuclear weapons was irresistible for Qadhafi. A high-level Libyan delegation led by Major Raad Bin-Id al-Daffi from the Libyan Engineering and Military Industrialization arrived in Baghdad on August 30, 1995. They negotiated with the Iraqis a comprehensive agreement that still serves as the cornerstone of the Iraqi-Libyan strategic and military cooperation. The agreement stipulated the extent to which Libya would go to assist Iraq in the expansion of the Iraqis' own WMD programs as well as in evading the UN stringent surveillance of Iraq's military plants.

Former US Federal Prosecutor John Loftus in May 2004 confirmed on Fox News some of the earlier 2002, 2003 and 2004 reporting by GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs that Libya had hosted the Iraqi nuclear program, and further detail was added to this in the June 2004 book by GIS Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky, The Secret History of the Iraq War. Loftus, however, failed to note the Niger connection which was literally verified by the deception operation mounted by the Libyan ESO. Loftus told Fox News interviewer Eric Shawn:

Loftus: “I was told about this amazing wiretap where British Intelligence overheard a call from North Korea to Libya saying, 'My god, if the Americans ever go into Iraq, they're going to find out about our nuclear program. And who's going to pay all the Iraqi nuclear scientists in Libya if Saddam falls?’”

Shawn: "You're saying before the war there were Iraqi nuclear scientists working on a potential bomb in Libya before we launched this [war in Iraq]?”

Loftus: "Yeah. This was a treaty signed by a man called Ali Sobree. He was the Foreign Minister of Iraq. And he went to [Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-] Qadhafi and they worked out a whole protocol. Qadhafi would donate a hollowed out mountain in Libya; Iraq would provide the nuclear scientists, and North Korea would provide the uranium. And they would literally make a factory for nuclear weapons. And once that factory was complete, we had lost the war on terrorism. People don't realize that even a small nuclear weapon can kill 300,000 people. That's one hundred 9-11's. So that's why we put [garbled] bin Laden on the back burner — we were really focusing on getting the Ali Sobree protocol — we had to smash that ring."

Shawn: "Now when you talk about Saddam and the war on terror ... your indication is that [US] President [George W.] Bush understood this after 9-11 and he was mostly concerned about a nuclear bomb from Libya or Iraq or Iran."

Loftus: "Eric, that's EXACTLY it. Within a month after 9-11, British wiretaps showed that we had a MAJOR risk. Nuclear weapons in terrorist's hands would be devastating. And that's why the President said: 'OK, we're gonna shift the emphasis from Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden. We're gonna go into Iraq - that's where the evidence is - we have to capture Ali Sobree."

Later in the interview Loftus noted:

"It was THE major strategy. Qadhafi has now confirmed he is going to hand the Ali Sobree protocols over to the United States. Sobree, himself, is now in US custody and he is already scheduled as one of the first three witnesses in the trial of Saddam Hussein.”